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Walter Benjamin's "Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner tech­
nischen Reproduzierbarkeit" ("The Work of Art in the Age ofMechanical 
Reproduction") appeared in the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung several 
months after the Reich Broadcasting Company announced "the world' s 
first regular television service. " 1 The near simultaneity of the appearance 
of a new mass medium and an implicit critique of its cultural inscription 
marks a striking conjunction. Given the massive cultural role television 
subsequently assumed, and Benjamin' s relative marginalization to a small 
circle of intellectuals, it seems astonishing that his essay achieved a much 
higher profile in cultural memory than did the considerable develop­
ments of German television broadcasting between 1935 and 1944. 
Benjamin's discussion of a cultural shift to reception in a state 
of distraction, and with it his prescient observations regarding mass 
aesthetics and politics, stands as but one of a spectrum of discourses 
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surrounding the emergence of television. In Germany in particular, the 
diversified and often conflicting administrative units and personalities 
responsible for television broadcasting were quite articulate about their 
visions of the medium . Whether the socialist wing of the N ationalsozialis­
tische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) or friends of corporate capital­
ism in the Postal Ministry, whether through the persuasive interests of 
the Propaganda Ministry or the martial interests of the Air Ministry, 
whether goverrunental entities or multinational electronics corporations, 
ail contributed to a vision of television-its organization, programming, 
and potential impact-which reveals as much about the state of the 
medium as the historical assumptions in which this vision was embedded. 
Internecine warfare among these interests spawned numerous debates 
and policy positions, some of which were publicly promoted through the 
press in Germany and abroad. Yet, despite abundant discourse, despite 
the widespread involvement of public and private institutions , somehow 
the very existence of German television broadcasting in this early period 
has slipped from popular memory.  The ease with which the British and 
Americans lay unchallenged daim to that always tenuous position of 
"first" in their assertion of primacy in regular public television broadcast­
ing stands as but one manifestation of this situation. 2 
This essay traces several strands of the discourse emerging from 
the period, using the patterns of evidence on German television together 
with elements of its ongoing representation as reflections of broader 
historical concerns .  The story of television's development appears inter­
twined in a complex web of determinants . Sorting them out offers the 
potential to reveal the medium as a site of contestation and cultural 
paradox, while reflecting back upon the character of the ever-changing 
national , technological , and economic historical paradigms through 
which it has been represented. Whether during the Third Reich or the 
Cold War, these perspectives have continued to shape public access to 
the events surrounding television between 1935 and 1944, accounting in 
large part for their curious omission from contemporary studies . This 
essay will thus sketch out and problematize concepts of German history 
as inscribed within the cultural configuration and representation of early 
German television in trade journals, the popular press, scholarly essays , 
and other texts . 
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German television before 1944, as a medium of representation 
and transmission, dealt tangibly with images of history and thus its 
programming might seem to provide more direct access to concepts of 
German history than discourse about it .  Whether enveloping events 
such as the 1936 Olympie Garnes in the aura of the "world historical, " or 
broadcasting feature and Kulturfilme with explicitly historical subjects, 
television continually demonstrated its potential as an agent in the con­
struction of popular memory. The transmitted sporting events, fi lms,  
news, drama, and public affairs programs that made up the typical Ger­
man broadcast day all would seem to resonate with the fullness of the 
historical moment, but two factors motivate this essay's focus on discur­
sive practices . 
First, virtually no intact programming from 1935 through 1944 
exists . The little that has been discovered-several clips and compilation 
films for broadcast-while useful for the pursuit of specific topics, largely 
precludes systemwide analysis . 3 Second, while television was well publi­
cized and while receivers were promised at reasonable prices, estimates 
suggest that only between two hundred and one thousand sets were 
actually available . Despite the steady expansion of the program day, 
German television fundamentally lacked an audience. For the most part, 
the German public had much greater exposure to the discourse about 
television than any direct experience of the medium .  
Although textless i n  a traditional sense, the many contradictions 
pervading German television's national and international development 
together with the patterns of its historical treatment suggest television's 
relevance as metatext, as a lens on the broader patterns of German 
history. The kinds of questions that can be raised about early German 
television,  and our evidence-based access to them, may be used to 
reveal µie assumptions and functions of the surrounding institutional and 
technological discourse. M uch more so than in the case of cinema with 
its relatively long-term international organizational and representational 
practices (encouraging analytic focus on individual films and reception 
as the site of specific historical concepts) , television' s brief history prior 
to 1944 and its unique institutional status encourage this metatextual 
approach . 
4 Divided among three ministries, struggled over by national 
and multinational corporations, and driven on by ideologues of various 
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inclinations, technological visionaries, and bureaucrats television ex­
isted at the nexus of an array of forces central to the epoch' s development. 
Television's proximity to the agents of the state and capital that helped 
to define the Reich, in turn, fueled postwar interpretive strategies. More 
often than not, historical television found itself contextualized within a 
series of specific ideological discourses. Thus, critiques of the Reich as 
aberrant capitalism or as a deviant (totalitarian) state apparatus appeared 
on the level of discussions of television, in the process, invoking and 
inscribing Germany's ongoing history. 
This essay, then, seeks to approach the discourse surrounding 
television, both within the Third Reich and since, as a representation of 
German history in its own right. To this end, the central role played by 
concepts such as nationalism and technology in discursive practice will 
be explored, providing a parallel and counterpoint to the thematic repre­
sentations in film and television content discussed elsewhere in this 
volume. Nationalist rhetoric in particular played a significant and often 
overarching role in the otherwise disparate motives of the man y constitu­
encies struggling for control of pre-1944 broadcast efforts. The political 
interests of different factions within the NSDAP, the careerist motives 
of individuals in the scientific, governmental, and corporate communi­
ties, and the economic interests of multinational corporations all legiti­
mized themselves in their embrace ofbroadly nationalistic goals. More­
over, although the nuances of nationalism changed in the course of the 
country's postwar physical bifurcation, the concept' s dominant role in 
representations of early television remained unchallenged. Indeed, on 
both sicles of the divide, differing configurations of nation helped to 
express the ideological distinction of the "other" Germany, both in the 
sense of the Third Reich and of opposing sicles of the wall. 
Yet in the postwar years, nearly a decade of television broadcast­
ing, and with it a set of rather impressive advances, slipped from popular 
memory. The complexities of television' s development withi.n the Reich, 
the often contradictory available evidence compounded by the postwar 
division of archives, and the broader problem of accommodating diver­
gent concepts of history and explanatory paradigms all contributed to the 
near loss of a past that laid the foundation for the soon pervasive "new" 
medium of the 1950s. 
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The Struggle for Control 
The discourses and developmental patterns surrounding televi­
sion' s appearance in German y chart not only a limited range ofbroadcast­
specific interests, but reveal the interworkings among individuals, minis­
tries, and national and multinational corporations in the perception and 
formation of a new mass medium. The terms in which this new medium 
appeared, as Benjamin suggested, fundamentally challenged the project 
ofhuman agent-oriented history and the role of rational discourse within 
it. As we shall see, broadcasting authorities advocated group viewing of 
television specifically to preclude the array of audience negotiations that 
they felt atomized home viewing encouraged. Moreover, the discursive 
framing of television crystallized an equally telling shift in the conception 
of technology. In place of the Enlightenment principle of science as a 
means to the common good of humanity, technology appeared as a tool 
in the service of the German nation. Whether by implanting the image 
of the Führer in the hearts of his people, proclaiming the superiority of 
German technology, or using television guidance systems for torpedoes 
and missiles, a discursive tradition that had remained vital, despite 
nationalistic challenges to it in the nineteenth century and at the start of 
the twentieth century, had emphatically ended. 
On 22 March 1935, Reichssendeleiter (Director of Broadcasting) 
Eugen Hadamovsky declared, "Today National Socialist broadcasting, 
working together with the Postal Ministry and German industry, begins 
as the first broadcasting system in the world with regular television 
programming. One of man's boldest dreams has been realized. "5 By 
pointing to the shared mission of government and national industry, 
Hadamovsky' s address accurately located the dynamic that propelled 
German broadcasting into the forefront of international activity. While 
some very real benefits emerged from this conjunction, it also resulted 
in fundamental contradictions particularly for the German electronics 
industry. 
Rapid advances in cable technology, in the live transmission of 
images (used in the 1936 Olympics), and in receiver technology were 
promoted and heavily marketed in the annual public broadcast exhibi­
tions to both domestic and foreign markets. Each of the major electronics 
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companies developed a wide .variety of home receivers and displayed 
them with appropriate hype to a market ready for the future. Despite 
initial intercorporate competition, the government extended its coordi­
nating function, evident in new politico-economic formulations of socially 
sanitized monopoly-capitaüst production such as the Volkswagen and 
Volksempfiinger, to television, and in so doing, mapped the route to 
prosperity for the major electronics concerns. Nationalism was good for 
business. 
The electronics industry fully expected purchases of home tele­
vision receivers to parallel the levels already experienced by radio. 
In 1937 Germans held over eight million radios-by far the heaviest 
concentration on the continent-and this was merely the midpoint of a 
campaign to place "a radio in every German house.''6 Yet by 1939, only 
two hundred home television sets had been sold. 
Extrapolating from its experience with radio, the German elec­
tronics industry had every reason to believe that it would experience 
massive television sales. Although it became increasingly clear that Ger­
many' s industrywide standardization (the clown sicle of the government's 
coordination [ G/,eichschaltung]) would li mit profit margins and the com­
petitive distribution of capital, most large industries already had experi­
enced the benefits of state regulation and consequent reduction of inter­
corporate competition during the First World War. Moreover, at least 
within the electronics industry, stock ownership patterns and_ board of
director memberships demonstrated widespread integration of owner­
ship and control, facilitating intercorporate cooperation and financing. 7 
But while the government encouraged this development, its role was 
not without contradiction. 
Government regulation and coordination facilitated technologi­
cal development and norms, but they quickly ran counter to industry 
expectations. Elements within the govemment, and particularly those 
with NSDAP affiliations, appeared to have had a very distinct concept of 
television' s form and social fonction. Tensions between the two dominant 
plans for television, i.e., industry' s and the party' s, both garbed in 
the protective cloak of national interest, played themselves out most 
explicitly in ministerial disputes. The government regulated television, 
like radio, through several channels including the Postal.Ministry (Reichs-
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postministerium [RPM]), the Reich Broadcasting Company (Reichsrund­
funkgesellschaft [RRG]), the Propaganda Ministry controlled Broad­
casting Chamber (Reichsrundfunkkammer), and ultimately Goebbels's 
Ministry for Enlightenment and Propaganda (Reichsministerium Jür 
Volksaufkliirung und Propaganda). The Postal Ministry, long allied with 
the electronics industry, acted in a manner consistent with its counter­
parts in Britain and the United States and mandateô television's technical 
standardization. 
But the Propaganda Ministry, with its much closer affiliation to 
the NSDAP, asserted a distinct development plan, suggesting audience 
homologies somewhat doser to film (centralized, public screening) than 
radio (decentralized, private listening). The propaganda theory then in 
vogue, strongly supported by Hadamovsky and Goebbels, favored the 
efficacy of group reception as a means to ensure consistent interpretation 
and minimize aberrant negotiations of meaning. And so initially, to 
the dismay of the corporate community, public television halls seating 
between forty and four hundred people emerged as the primary recep­
tion forum (an approach not dissimilar to that used in the Soviet Union 
at the time). 
The development of this conflicting strategy-preparation for a 
strong home receiver market on the part o� industry versus the govern­
ment' s push for a mass viewing environment-emerges from a number 
of changing factors. These include the aforementioned propaganda theo­
ries; the early "socialist" tendencies of National Socialism (supporting 
public viewing until receiver cost was affordable to the masses); changing 
technical standards (180 lines through 1937 and 441 lines in 1938 and 
after); and the shifting role of multinational corporations in political policy 
throughout the National Socialist period; together with the initiating 
mission.of German television broadcasting. Again, Hadamovsky, "Now, 
in this hour, broadcasting is called upon to fulfill its greatest and most 
sacred mission_: to plant the image of the Führer indelibly in all German 
hearts. "8 While the business community apparently had no reservations 
about this mission, its implementation posed substantial problems. By 
the late 1930s, as the technical situation finally stabilized around a 441 
line norm, industry together with the Postal Ministry moved ahead with 
plans for consumer sector receivers. Ironically, just as mass production 
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orders for television receivers were issued, the shift to a war economy 
together with the restrictive broadcast laws of 1939 precluded the mass 
production and marketing plans so evident in the corporate record and 
at the Berlin television exhibitions. 9 
As previously suggested, Hadamovsky' s inaugurating speech 
accurately located the dynamic that propelled German television broad­
casting by pointing to the "shared mission" of the government and na­
tional industry. The exact nature of that mission, however, remained 
unclear. Expressions of solidarity, protection, and mutual support bound 
governmental and corporate interests together. However, equally dis­
tinct tensions between the government and the private sector, apparent 
in the national coloration of multinational trade concerns, interministerial 
policy struggles, and the perception of and lobbying for various models 
of television' s organization, also pervade the period. 
As a result of the Postal Ministry's and particularly Hans 
Bredow's interest between 1926 and 1934, the government provided 
heavy subsidies for television's technical development (together with 
related technologies of cable, telephone, wired and wireless image trans­
mission, and amplifier development). 10 These subsidies reflected the 
ministry' s long-standing concern with and structural involvement in com­
munications technologies, a level of involvement evident before the turn 
of the century and one frequently articulated in terms of potential military 
applications. Patents such as Paul Nipkow's 1884 electronic telescope 
and Dieckmann's 1906 facsimile transmission device-both directly re­
lated to early television systems-manifested a dimension of televisual 
communication consistent with and of relevance to supravening national 
concems. 11 The Enlightenment project of science and technology for the 
common good fell under siege well before the formation of the party that 
would eventually epitomize its collapse. 
Based on Postal Ministry correspondence with the Finance Min­
istry (Reichsfinanzministerium) during the Weimar Republic, national 
security seems to have been a motivating factor in the government' s 
expenditures on the development of related technologies. Among the 
assertions that emerged, two dominate subsequent discourse. First, 
assumptions regarding hard information transfer fundamentally unify the 
sense of these technologies, their national security potential, and their 
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consequent character, coordination, and control through governmental 
agencies (ultimately the RPM). Second, governmental subsidy of the 
massive research and development costs for these technologies in domes­
tic firms, and the subsequent privatization of the results at the point of 
commercial application suggest the special nature of the government's 
relationship to private corporations. 12 This type of supportive integration 
for the mutual benefit of industry and the state set the pace for subse­
quent developments, including continued governmental subsidies, regu­
lations, and ultimately, coordination with the NSDAP agenda. 
The intrusion of a set of somewhat more economically autono­
mous players complicated the Postal Ministry' s inroads into selected 
portions of the domestic electronics industry. From 1921 through the 
early 1930s (with a particular flurry of activity brought on by the stabiliz­
ing of the mark through the Dawes Plan in 1924), U. S. -based multina­
tional corporations played an important role in the German economy. 
German businesses floated over $826 million in bonds in the United 
States, and many American firms invested heavily in German companies, 
entering into partnerships or establishing subsidiaries, including Dow 
Chemical, Ford, General Motors, 1. E. DuPont, and General Electric. 13 
The multinational patent base of many technologies also encouraged 
a broad pattern of license and patent-sharing agreements, evident in 
television technology with companies such as Baird, RCA, Farnsworth, 
and International Telephone and Telegraph. 14 Fernseh A. G., one -of 
Germany' s two largest television companies, was founded in part by 
Baird International Television (in partnership with Robert Bosch, Zeiss 
Ikon, and D. S. Loewe) and shared patents with Farnsworth. 15 Other 
television companies had equally complicated relations: Lorenz (and its 
related conglomerate, Standard Elektrizitiits Gesellschaft [SEG]) was a 
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ization potential of a new technology brought with it the possibility for 
rapid expansion absent in more traditional sectors, and an established 
interest group eagerly awaited an opportunity to profit by it. As interna­
tional trade and popular press reception indicate, not only Germany 
but other countries as well tended to nationalize fully multinational 
technology and therefore profits. But this nationalistic discourse also 
masked the ownership and licensing patterns of multinational corpora­
tions such as IT&T and RCA, which were able to sustain profits in diverse 
markets despite increasing international hostilities. 
The apparent tension between multinational developments (the 
necessity of patent sharing, attempts to integrate new markets, and so 
on) and national interest emerged in several ways. The world economic 
crisis of the late 1920s certainly encouraged multinational investment, 
as did an awareness of the international realities of technologies such as 
the telephone and telegraph. 1
7 
Moreover, growing evidence indicates 
that early National Socialist economic policy was receptive to develop­
ment, driven more by attempts to restore business confidence with 
promises of modernization and financial security than by threats of for­
eign war. Like autobahn construction and car production, developments 
in television provided a propaganda coup for the government while 
bolstering the confidence of the domestic business community (electron­
ics in particular). 18 The state saw exports as critical to economic survival 
and thus structurally encouraged national expressions (and sales) of the 
new technology through subsidies and truc incentives, even when depen­
dent upon others' patents. 19 
The Postal Ministry sponsored elaborate marketing opportuni­
ties through the annual broadcast exhibitions and the heavily publicized 
televising of the 1936 Olympics. 20 Foreign press received special consid­
eration, and great care went into providing state of the art communica­
tions facilities. Perhaps more importantly, the Postal Ministry encour­
aged competition among the various electronics firms and multinational 
licensing affilia.tes, effectively holding out the prize of national conversion 
to the winner' s standard. Thus, the Olympics served as a battleground for 
Fernseh/Farnsworth and Telefunken/RCA, ail the while demonstrating 
"German" television to the world. 21 ln sharp contrast to the policy of 
secrecy that veiled parallel British and sometimes American develop-
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ments, Germany seemed to take the initiative, positioning itself to leap 
ahead into the international market. 
The start of war in 1939 substantially complicated the picture, 
enhancing the protective coloration of multinationals. Structural con­
straints such as the British, German, and American trading-with-the­
enemy acts, the American freezing acts, and the roles played by various 
offices of alien property custodians resulted in curious contradictions. 22 
Licensing agreements and patent exchanges between German electron­
ics corporations and American firms such as IT&T continued after 1941, 
and IT&T retained control of its subsidiaries (including 28.3 percent 
of the Focke-Wulf military aircraft company) and even expanded its 
operations in German y du ring the war. 23 
The explicit shift to military applications of television technology 
after 1939 might seem to have inhibited multinational corporate activi­
ties. But, given the previously mentioned long-standing and close rela­
tionship of the electronics and telecommunications industries to national 
security interests, such developments came as no surprise to the multina­
tionals. The contradictions that emerged in this period constitute a re­
pressed chapter in the history of multinationals, helping to account for 
the complexity and sensitivity of the situation in the postwar period. 24 
Within Germany, a complex set of overlapping jurisdictional 
daims and disputes characterized the government's involvement with 
television after 1933. The Postal Ministry, for example, encountered 
television through its own matrix of intraministerial agencies including 
the Deutsche Reichspost, the Reichspostzentralamt (RPZ), the 
Forschungsanstalt der DRP, and through its role in the Reich Broadcast­
ing Company. Interministry relations held more potential for serious 
confüct. From its inception in 1933, the Propaganda Ministry was em­
broiled in a chronic fight with the Postal Ministry over shares of radio 
license income and ultimately control over the Reich Broadcasting Com­
pany (a struggle that ultimately caused the collapse of the Reich Cham ber 
Broadcasting). 25 Even on the petty level of rent payments for the televi­
sion halls, disputes emerged between the Postal Ministry and the 
NSDAP, the latter refusing to pay for the few halls it controlled. An 
extreme, though telling, eruption among several ministries followed 
Hitler's awarding of overall control of television to Reich Air Minister 
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Goering in July 1935 (a transfer of power carefully kept from the press). 26 
The Postal Ministry and Propaganda Ministry both protested vigor­
ously, 27 and despite Goebbels's attempts to strike a side-deal with War 
Minister Blomberg, by December a new directive divided responsibility 
among all the players. 28 The Postal Ministry was given responsibility 
for technical development and transmission; the Propaganda Ministry, 
programming; and the Air Ministry, defense applications. 29 Additional 
parallel and often overlappingjurisdictions were established by the Nazi 
party through the Gau system, and the division of power was further 
complicated by the organizational affiliations of various labor groups. 
One of the clearest tensions to emerge in this matrix of overlap­
ping jurisdictions and interests regarded the exhibition of television and 
involved the Postal and Propaganda Ministries. Although involved in an 
ongoing series of disputes over income and cost sharing, .their struggle 
masked a deeper division. Staffed by career specialists who had long­
standing relationships with the industrial sector, the postal authorities 
coordinated technical developments and, until 1933, controlled broad­
cast fees. By contrast, recently empowered party members dominated 
the Propaganda Ministry and eut into the Post' s turf and fees with their 
party-specific agenda. Goebbels and Hadamovsky typified the latter. 30 
Moreover, as Germany's leading propaganda theorists, both concurred 
that mass reception of propaganda was most effective, and Hadamovsky 
consequently encouraged the public character of television's reception. 
The electronics industry, and with it the Post (ever dependent on license 
fee revenues), pressed for the widespread proliferation of individual 
home receivers, consistent with that of radio's development. 
The widely divergent interests and strategies of the various 
constituencies among and within the ministries, together with the com­
plications fostered by the different factions of the NSDAP point to the 
inadequacy of unified national interest as an explanatory paradigm for 
the historical development of television. "Führer" and "Vaterland" were 
certainly invoked at any given opportunity, but the record suggests that 
politicians and industrialists were moti':'ated by self-interest rather than 
any commitment to the nation or the common good. Nationalistic dis­
course about television deviated from the Enlightenment principles of 
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the common good by providing protective coloration to the narrow inter­
ests of bureaucracies and individuals. 
ln terms of the medium' s physical development, many of these 
same factors-national and multinational industrial interests, govern­
mental agencies, and rapidly shifting technical standards, together with 
the pressures of the world economy-suggest a number of possible causal 
factors. Serious disputes on any one of these levels might have been 
sufficient to delay television's standardization and deployment. Con­
versely, appropriate pressures from one or another sector may have been 
able to consolidate interests. 
Closure, when it came, was marked by the emergence of a 
technical standard and the convergence of the major electronics firms. As 
in Britain with the competing Baird and EMI/Marconi systems, Germany 
initially faced the Fernseh (Farnsworth/Baird patents) and Telefunken 
(RCA) systems, the technical grounds for the delay in receiver produc­
tion. The situation was complicated by a nationalistic tenacity regarding 
mechanical systems (the Nipkow disk), given both the high state of 
refinement it reached as a result of exacting engineering and manufacture 
(high vacuum technology) and its status as "purely German."31 Neverthe­
less, Zworykin's iconoscope emerged as the superior technology, and in 
1937, 441 lines formally appeared as the German standard. 32 Through 
the coordinating fonction of the RPZ and the RRG, all of the competing 
electronics manufacturers, despite their previous and ongoing corporate 
and license agreements, converted, thus clearing the way for the coopera­
tive mass production of receivers. Approval of designs for the low-cost 
Fernseh-Volksempfi:inger [the "people's television receiver"] were held­
up untü late in 1938, a delay that would seem to have cost the electronics 
industry dearly. As noted, soon after the RPM issued its first large order, 
the war began, and production of consumer receivers slowed to a near 
stop. Despite apparent stasis, research, planning, and programming 
continued to develop rapidly. Work on a nationwide cable system contin­
ued, and the program day, which had averaged 3 hours a day until 1938 
(excluding the Olympics) reached 6.5 hours in the early 1940s (including 
1.5 hours live). 33 Access to receivers remained limited largely to function­
aries, with many of the available private sets being diverted to use 
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in military hospitals and recreation centers . Television viewing rooms 
remained the predominant public venue, and research continued in the 
area of large beam video projectors and high-definition systems of l ,029 
and even 2,000 lines . 34 
Significantly, post-1939 research and development stressed ex­
plicit military application. Reconnaissance (hence, the interest in high 
definition), television-guided missiles, bombs and torpedoes,  as well as 
spin-offs such as heat-seeking missiles and related technologies under­
went rapid development paralleling developments in the United States . 
Based on a preliminary analysis, both the production levels and profit 
margins of the German electronics industry' s involvement with the mili­
tary greatly exceeded their efforts (and perhaps potentials) in the civilian 
sector. 
Television as History 
Even a gloss of television's development in Germany reveals 
a matrix of contradictions complicating the roles and relationships of 
technological research, national and multinational industrial develop­
ment, and state economic coordination. In some senses a testament 
to the remarkably diverse and often conflicting appeals and interests 
encompassed by the Third Reich, television stands as but one of many 
instances whose very development inscribes and reifies the complexity 
of a historical moment. While useful as a comparative model to alternative 
and better documented media systems, the extremity of the German 
situation also serves to highlight relationships and tensions present in 
the broader scheme of modern German history. 
German television appears distinctive both because of the 
NSDAP's attempts to dominate the medium as a mode of party-specific 
agitation (most evident in the activities of the Propaganda Ministry) and 
because of the explicit coordination of private and public sector efforts 
in the introduction and promotion of television (through the Postal Minis­
try) . As such, it might appear that the social production of German 
television, together with television as a means of production within that 
social framework, share a highly specific and nationally circumscribed 
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set of referents . Certainly this perspective offers useful possibilities, 
particularly in the light of a reconsideration of German y' s pre-1939 eco­
nomic policy . The idiosyncratic particularity of the German case, in 
tum, could be seen as motivating the marginalization of this moment of 
broadcast history in subsequent discourse. 
In contrast to these positions,  however, doser investigation of 
the underlying structural unities binding the German experience to 
parallel developments in other national markets-the United States and 
Great Britain for instance-permits the contours of a broader technologi­
cal-economic system to appear. The multinational character of televi­
sion' s research and development, the patterns of its technological trans­
mission (patent sharing and licensing agreements) , its place in the fabric 
of early twentieth-century economic growth, coupled with the explicit 
industrial involvement of RCA, IT&T, AEG, and so on, ail suggest a set 
of common denominators that call into question concepts of historical 
process that focus almost exclusively on the nation state and national 
loyalties .  Moreover, in the shift to the far more profitable military appli­
cation of television technology and in the maintenance of at least some 
explicit multinational corporate connections involving weapons systems 
throughout the war substantial contradictions to the received view 
emerge. 
Although a wide range of factors appear to account for German y' s 
development of television ,  cultural configurations further complicate the 
nation's status in broadcast history . The relationship between period 
reception and consequent historical representation provides valuable 
insight into the shifting history of mentalities in the postwar period. 
The diversity of the available record and the selection process whereby 
historical questions and methods frame particular strands of that record 
as relevant reveal the broadly ideological role played by television as a 
cultural entity and as an object of study. 
Of the many possible expressions through which the process of 
German television' s concrete historical representation can be traced, a 
start can be made by examining the public reception of several constitu­
encies as distinguished by their relationship to the medium . An account 
of the approaches taken by the domestic and foreign popular press,  
the trade press, and the industry through their published reports and 
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circulated opinions throws one dimension of the basic contours and 
nuances of the situation into comparative light. Of course, such an ap­
proach at best suggests the general public orientation of the institution 
making the utterance and of necessity misses the fuller range of social 
forces and the consequent plurality of discourses (many of which have 
already been mentioned). 35 But as an indication of public positioning,
this approach provides at least the broad contours of reception while 
constituting the type of evidence to which subsequent generations of 
historians have had ready access. Thus I will sketch the view of television 
presented to the general public through newspapers, to the electronics 
trade and professionals through their journals, and to the corporations 
through reports in order to reveal one set of television' s public contours. 
For reasons of expediency, German and American reception during 1935 
will be used to map out the spectrum of responses. 
The heavily publicized start of public broadcasting in 1935 may 
have lacked a viewing public, but it nonetheless appealed to mass audi­
ences through extensive and intensive press campaigns. A spectrum of 
attitudes emerged in the popular press, and 1935--the year Germany 
introduced its public television service-provides a nodal point in the 
representation and configuration of perceptions. 36 Within German y, with 
its already centralized press service, Reich Broadcasting Company press 
releases and hyperbolized commentaries heralded the nation's technical 
achievement as proof of a new direction in both industrial and consumer 
sectors and as evidence of the fruitful collaboration of state and industrial 
interests. Television as evidence of Germany's technological superiority, 
as a vindication of its new economic order, as tangible proof of the 
benefits of the Reich permeated domestic press coverage. Multinational 
affiliations, relatively prominent in the trade press, rarely appeared in 
popular reports, although the visits of American and British scientists 
sometimes received attention as further proof of Germany's lead in the 
field. The public nature of exhibition often appeared as evidence of an 
egalitarian policy by which free television service was provided to all 
until receivers reached a sufficiently affordable level (the latter proposi­
tion always posited in imminent terms). 
The popular press in Britain and the United States often exhib­
ited a similarly nationalistic tone in television discussions. The New 
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York Times repeatedly mentioned German attempts to attain parity with 
American standards rather than British, despite the absence of formai or 
even licensed experimental American broadcasting. Nevertheless, the 
centrality of United States patents and the assertions of its technological 
superiority appeared regularly. 37 In addition, a recurrent tendency to 
privilege British over German developments dominated the popular 
press, despite the fact that in some cases the British technology at issue 
had not actually been seen by the reporter (and the reviewed German 
systems were acknowleged to be both varied and available). 38 
An awareness of competition and its dangers also entered the 
discourse. The importance and rapid growth of radio in Germany was 
regularly noted and used to forecast projected developments in televi­
sion. 39 Often, German developments were cast in whàt might be de­
scribed as motivational terms, as a headline from the New York Times 
emphasized, "Germany rushes work on TV system: Berlin doesn't intend 
to be outdone by London in the matter of television."40 J. Royal, vie� 
president of the National Broadcasting Company, exaggerated the medi­
um' s impact in Germany relative to the United Sates market as part of 
a broader attempt to stimulate federal licensing agreements, saying, 
"Television is rapidly becoming a national pastime in Germany. "41 
In contrast to this nationalized and competitive discourse about 
the historical development of television in Germany, both the German 
and international professional trade press-at least until declarations of 
war-dutifully reported technical innovations both from the perspective 
of patent and license sharing agreements and from that of new manufac­
turing techniques. The Journal of the Royal Television Society, for exam­
ple, devoted substantial space to detailed descriptions of and debate 
about the annual broadcasting exhibitions in Germany, carefully compar­
ing available receiver models and studio technique and frequently la­
menting the British penchant for secrecy. Visiting delegations of engi­
neers reported on their findings, and generally the trade literature 
reveals a pattern of respect for German engineering and technological 
craft but dismay about their (initial) retention of mechanical systems and 
programming. 42 
For its part, the German trade press-and particularly Telefun­
ken and Fernseh A. G. 's technical journals-disseminated the details of 
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the latest patent acquisitions from their American or British affiliate
s
while addressing their own progress. A revealing source for the c
lose
cooperation among multinationals, the German professional trades pr
o­
vide a rich evidence base until their termination with the start of tot
al
war in 1941. The German trades differed from their British and Americ
an
counterparts only in the specificity of their occasionally nationaliz
ed
discourse particularly evident in the historical grounding of devel
op­
mental issues. Thus, for example, discussions of the prominent place
 of
Paul Nipkow and Manfred von Ardenne in television's evolution an
d
their continuing role in the medium' s development appeared only in th
e
German context. 
While refiecting the interests of the multinational electronics
and telecommunications industry, corporate discourse presents seri
ous
research difficulties because of the generally private nature of its exp
res­
sions. Nevertheless, selected elements of the record appear in gov
ern­
ment files, corporate officers' memoirs, reports to stockholders, 
and
postwar litigation records.
43 Remaining within the sample year, 1935-
36, American industry generally focused on German y' s technical achie
ve­
ments. British efforts received much doser attention because their 
pro­
gramming developments and receiver marketing strategies more clo
sely
paralleled American plans. 
44 German programming, in addition to the
differences emerging from its avowed political function, was also ling
uis-
tically marginalized. 
David Sarnoff s 1936 report to the Federal Communications
Commission, The Future of Radio, noted that "other nations are 
ac­
cepting the standards and methods of RCA engineers and are apply
ing
them to the solution oftheir own television problems."
45 Sarnoffs reports
to RCA's stockholders, however, were more explicit, with statemen
ts of
annual patent income reaching levels of $20,166,545.06 (minus re
serve
for patents of $11,503,333.79 or $8,663,211.27) in 1934 .
46 Within the
United States, at least, television's competitive implications for 
radio
seemed to occupy a sizeable part of the available t935 record.
Meanwhile, industry executives and technicians carefully docu­
mented developments in England, Germany, Japan, Argentina, an
d the
Soviet Union, pursuing market openings and remaining full y abre
ast of
technological transformation and application. Marked by Feder
al Corn-
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munications Commissioner Sykes's wait-and-see approach, the industry 
seemed to monitor Germany, like England, as a testing ground for the 
early battles of Farnsworth and RCA technology. 
Even from this brief sketch of television' s popular, trade, and in­
dustrial reception during 1935, television' s cultural configuration, compli­
cated by the matrix of intersecting structural reasons previously suggested, 
appears in often confüctingterms. Yet ifnothing else, discussion of Germa­
n y' s developments at.least penetrated the populations addressed by the se 
various joumals. Given this sort of public presence, how can we account 
for the postwar marginalization of developments in pre-1945 German tele­
vision? What range of interpretations have been made of this record (to­
gether with the much fuller available evidence base) and to what extent do 
they inscribe concepts of German history? A glance at the postwar recon­
figuration of discourse suggests the broad contours of a response. The pro­
cess of television' s cultural reconfiguration implicitly problematizes the 
relationships among technology, industry, and poli tics while revealing one 
strand in the ongoing construction of history. 
The postwar representation of German television refiects the 
range of material constraints, such as archivai access, and perhaps more 
importantly, ideological assumptions upon which our current interpreta­
tions rest. Three developments exemplify the spectrum. of the subject' s 
dominant historical representations: (1) immediate postoccupation intel­
ligence reports, (2) scholarship emerging from the Propaganda Ministry 
archives in the FRG, and (3) scholarship based upon the Postal Ministry 
archives in the GDR. The divergence among these approaches helps to 
throw into relief some of the assomptions evident in current research. 
At the same time, these approaches are bound together by a use of history 
that implies common interest and common historical development in 
opposition to a threatening other. Most often defined as fascistic, the 
depiction of the other often has resonated with the other Germany. 
One source of information on the immediate postwar state of 
German television and a close overview of its briefhistory appears in the 
American FIAT (Field Intelligence Agency, Technical Division), British 
BIOS (British Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee), and joint Ameri­
can and British CIOS (Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee) 
reports. Working largely in the service of industry, both as a source of 
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patent war booty and as a base for patent infringement litigation, these
studies emerged from extensive interviews and investigations held as
closely as possible to actual military seizure of enemy property. Em­
ployed by the United States Department of Commerce and the British
Board of Trade, FIAT/BIOS/CIOS interviewers tended to be civilian
specialists temporarily on leave from companies such as RCA and IT&T.
In many cases the record shows thàt the interviewers were well ac­
quainted with the German engineers and technicians they interrogated
through prewar contact. Their interviews confirm the directions of tech­
nical activity as well as levels of production for the German television
industry. Given the post-1941 termination of many German trade publi­
cations, this evidence is of vital importance. For example, BIOS Report
No. 867 reported that Fernseh's Obertannwald facilities employed 750
persons and that Telefunken's factories were producing up to 300 mini­
cameras for missile installation per month with semiskilled female labor­
ers, thus suggesting both the scale and orientation of television-related
production late in the war. 
A distinct pattern of competitive investigation emerges in the
BIOS, FIAT, and CIOS files. BIOS reports often note that equipment
had been removed by the Americans prior to British investigation, and
the fonction of CIOS was largely to coordinate and make sure that each
knew or had access to what the other was doing. Given the competitive
nature of the commercial interests both FIAT and BIOS served and
the profit potentials in seized technologies, this tension appears hardly
surprising. While corporate interests covered by a veneer of nationalism
appear throughout the reports, all three note that their Soviet counter­
parts played the game more seriously. For example, the Soviets are
reported not only to have dismantled and shipped east a Blaupunkt
factory involved in television receiver manufacture but to have shipped
the en tire staff as well. 
47 
The reports that emerged systematically failed to address organi-
zational issues or multinational patent sharing agreements, focusing in­
stead primarily on technical issues. Consistent with their charge, these
studies isolated technology frorn either politics or industrial develop­
ment. But the very nature of the investigations, together with their close
correlation to the efforts of corporate intelligence and job recruiters,
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speak clearly to the underlying issue. Thus while explicitly providing 
valuable documentation of otherwise lost technological development, the 
FIAT/BIOS/CIOS reports implicitly testify to the continuing symbiosis of 
what Eisenhower called the "military industrial complex." The sense of 
other that emerges from these reports is compounded by the ease with 
which the investigators distanced themselves from paralle] (and often 
corporately interlocked) activities. In the process, an overriding vision 
of history as fundamentally self-serving appears with remarkable clarity. 
Postwar German scholarship on early television reflects the ideo­
logical and physical bifurcation of the FRG and GDR. While more often 
than not emerging from a conscious national perspective, the published 
research seems remarkably free of the self-interest that marked both pre-
1944 accounts and the BIOS/FIAT/CIOS reports. Yet, arguably, the 
project of constructing a national history, of selectively valorizing or 
criticizing developments in television' s brief history, inexorably inter­
twines broader issues of continuity and change in national identity. 
Thus, limited access to the archivai record compounded by (and at times 
coïncident with) broader ideological patterns of understanding the recent 
past reveal certain tendencies. In the light of the momentous changes 
now occurring in Germany's identity, in the context of the breakdown 
of the structural barriers that have limited scholars from both Germanies, 
these patterns seem more striking tl1an ever. Structural constraints 
emerge in part from the consequent division of German y' s archives, with 
the Propaganda Ministry's files for the most part located the FRG, and 
the Postal Ministry's files in the GDR. Given the previously discussed 
divergent interests and constituencies ofboth ministries, the implications 
of this division are profound. For heuristic purposes, the discussions that 
follow attempt to portray the broadest contours of the scholarship that has 
typified West and East block approaches to German television until the 
last decade. By comparing various scholars' accounts of German y' s failure 
to develop a market in consumer sector television receivers, we can quickly 
differentiate their perspectives. Emphasizing the common thrust of vari­
ous researchers necessarily sacrifices important nuance and distinctions, 
but at the same time, it suggests shared responses to limited evidence bases 
and supravening ideological contexts, revealing larger historical patterns. 
First, Gerhard Goebel's 1953 study, "Das Ferneshen in 
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Deutschland bis zum Jahre 1945 ,"  stands as a rare early and respected 
West German example of an attempt to synthesize the archivai evidence 
bases of both ministries. Despite a fabric of references that overlaps 
with much of the GOR scholarship, however, Goebel uses the material 
primarily to gather technological data rather than to discern organiza­
tional implications in a manner common to many other western scholars 
of the period. Based upon close investigation of the patent record, trade 
journals, technical reports, and interviews Goebel traces the evolution of 
German television technology. Although his overvieW includes program 
scheduling and analysis and suggests the economic contours of the indus­
try, his orientation generally coincides with the technical interests of the 
Postal Ministry (in which he served) without recourse to its archives or 
internai paperwork and as such remains grounded in its public reception . 
Thus as a measure of the Postal Ministry' s legitimate realm of concerns, 
Goebel' s influential work suggests the centrality of technological evolu­
tion-invention, modification, and refinement-as the factor primarily 
responsible for Germany' s delay in mass producing receivers . 
Heinz Pohle' s 1956 study and Winfried Lerg' s 1967 analysis both 
tend to rely on periodicals and public record, like Goebel's work, with 
minimal reference to archivai sources. 48 Thus, for example, by relying 
on trade publications and newspapers , both interpret the events sur­
rounding the 1935 jurisdictional disputes that resulted in the Air Minis­
try' s temporary control of television from a perspective largely consistent 
with that of the Propaganda Ministry. Perhaps more significantly, how­
ever, by relying on German periodical literature, they replicate the 
perspective of the Propaganda Ministry. By combining the hyperbolic 
tone of the Propaganda Ministry with the realities of television's technical 
development, they essentially argue that the delay in home receivers 
emerged from the industry' s premature start in 1935. By moving ahead 
too soon at the behest of the Propaganda Ministry, industry actually 
set itself back, never to recover . Both authors hint at the Propaganda 
Ministry' s de facto subversion of capitalist interests, but neither cites 
specific evidence. 
The archivai record now available in the FRG tends to confirm 
this perspective. The Propaganda Ministry files deal _tangibly with televi­
sion, but given the division of responsibility for television and the evident 
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confücts of interest established by 1935, this perspective provides only 
one piece of a complicated matrix of concerns. In correspondence with 
the perspectives of some western historians, the Propaganda Ministry's 
records indicate a concern with persuasion in programming that rein­
forces the notion of a seizure of power. Although evidence is certainly 
available in western archives to counter this position (copies of selected 
Postal Ministry correspondence to the finance office or chancellory, for 
instance), the Postal Ministry's corporate perspective and sensitivity 
remain only marginally represented. 
By contrast, efforts emerging from the GD R as exemplified by the 
work of Manfred Hempel produced work based on the Postal Ministry 
archives, providing a critically important complement to western scholar­
ship. Through the Postal Ministry, Hempel had access to the day-to-day 
workings of state and corporate interrelations, thus permitting a focus on 
the history of multinational investment, interindustry battles, and the pro­
cess of industrial-state coordination . Hempel accounts for early German 
television's failure to attract a public by documenting the infighting be­
tween Telefunken and Fernseh (and their respective multinational back­
ers), compounded by both companies' rapid abandonment oflow-cost tele­
vision developments for much higher profit military production . Thus the 
maintenance of full-scale television research and development (despite 
dropping the consumer market) together with the rapid technological 
expansion to related technologies appears in terms of corporate profit. Like 
his counterparts in the FRG, Hempel' s access to his archivai base permit­
ted him to affirm the GOR' s Marxist perceptions, in this case, the linkage 
offascism with monopoly capital. The same argument would be difficult to 
mount with access only to the Propaganda Ministry files. 
As Cold War tensions subside and reactive positions ,  pro and 
con, to corporate continuities with ù1e National Socialist past fade, the 
history of television continues to reflect the changes .  Sin ce the late 1970s, 
shifts in focus, access, and method have partially eroded this bifurcation .  
Erwin Reiss' s work largely popularized some of Hempel' s ideas in the 
West. 49 And thanks to the efforts of individuals such as Friedrich Kah­
lenberg, Angsar Diller, Knut Hickethier, Manfred Hempel, Winfried 
Lerg, Siegfried Zielinski ,  and groups such as the Studienkreis Rundfunk 
und Geschichte and the media study group at Siegen, the period has 
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confücts of interest established by 1935, this perspective provides only 
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Erwin Reiss' s work largely popularized some of Hempel' s ideas in the 
West. 49 And thanks to the efforts of individuals such as Friedrich Kah­
lenberg, Angsar Diller, Knut Hickethier, Manfred Hempel, Winfried 
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seen closer attention directed to issues such as reception, programming, 
relations between television and film, television genres, and close textual 
analysis in those few cases where texts exist. 50 
Conclusion 
The patterned production of evidence within the period of 1933 
to 1944 remains a highly complicated affair. Competing forces within 
individual ministries, coupled with interministerial disputes, all overlaid 
by the often contradictory interests of the party and individual national 
and multinational corporations, have simultaneously produced a highly 
diversified and complex evidence base. 
Several factors further skew the evidence . First, multinational 
involvement, often masked as national for protective reasons (particularly 
after the declaration of war to evade trading-with-the-enemy legislation), 
has clouded the evidence base . The material gathered by allied investiga­
tors in the immediate postwar period essentially served corporate inter­
ests: consolidating markets, updating patent pools, and locating new 
specialists. The rapid emergence of the cold war and the consequent 
reestablishment of old Allied-Axis corporate ties and quick rehabilitation 
of many Nazi collaborators in the West, together with the limited a,ccess 
to information or evidence in GDR archives,  further complicates the 
picture .  But more than anything else, the division of the archives along 
ministerial lines , particularly given television's development pattern in 
Germany, accounts for the character of the research effort. The division, 
of course, has to some seemed fortunate, given the ideological perspec­
tives on both sicles of the border, confümiog visions of the National 
Socialist epoch as anticapitalist, overregulated, propagandistically driven 
dictatorship in the West, and as monopoly-capitalist, crisis-averting con­
tradiction in the East. 
Throughout the development of early German televisioo, the role 
played by multinational corporate capitalism both prior to and during the 
war-a relationship that persists in the present-continues to be masked 
by a series of nationalistic discourses . As the television case demonstrates, 
investment, ownership, patent and license agreements, as well as the na-
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ture of, for example, telecommunications technology, assured steady tech­
nological transfer, whetherproductive or destructive. Despite this, orper­
haps because of it, analysts have on the whole chosen to work with cultural 
configurations of national dimensions . Only the most explicit in trusions of 
national-based programming into other nations seem consistently to at­
tract attention to multinational issues . But the underlying economic-tech­
nological identity of television within its full y multinational and monopoly­
capitalist framework requires much more careful address. 
The discourses surrounding the development of early German 
television and its subsequent representation reveal as much about the 
emergence of a technology as about the construction ofhistorical percep­
tions .  The history of National Socialist television's inscription in a set of 
nationalistic, technological , and economic discourses, particularly con­
sidering the effective excision of this cultural moment from popular 
memory, rais es fondamental questions about our ability to corne to terms 
with the Third Reich and Germany's fate in the intervening years . 
Notes 
1. German television broadcasting service was declared public on 22 March
1935; Benjamin' s article appeared in volume 5, number l of the 1936 issue.
2 . See William Uricchio and Brian Winston , "The Anniversary Stakes, " Sight
and Sound Autumn 1986: 231-32. British broadcasting began in 1936, termi­
nating with the start of war in 1939. Public American broadcasting, despite
early technological leads, was delayed until 1939 and even then proceeded
only on an experimental license.
3 . Despite the paucity of available evidence, attempts have been made to
examine television texts in terms of production and exhibition. Friedrich P.
Kahlenberg, for example, has examined a surviving Ufa made-for-television
compilation film in "Von deutschem Heldentum: Eine Film-Kompilation fur
das Fernsehen aus dem Jahre 1936, " Mitteilungen: Studienkreis Rundfunk
und Geschichte January 1979: 21-27, trans. and reprinted as "Von deutschem
Heldentum: A 1936 Compilation Film for Television, " Historical ]ournal of 
Film, Radio and Television 10. 2 (1990) : 187-92, and Knut Hickethier, on
the basis of scripts and interviews, has examined the production of television
dramas "The Television Play in the Third Reich , "  Historical]ournal of Film,
Radio and Television 10. 2 (1990) : 163-86.
4 . .  This is not to suggest that television emerged without reference to longer­
term cultural practices .  Theater, cinema, and in particular radio provided 
explicit homologies to which television referred. But despite representa-
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tional and organizational communalities ,  the discourse surrounding televi­
sion as television is relatively distinct. 
5. Mitteilungen der Reichsmndfunkgesellschaft, 460 (30 March 1935) . Unless
otherwise noted, al! translations are the author's .
6. Radio audiences increased dramatically through the joint efforts of the gov­
ernment and industry. Between 1 May 1932 and 1 May 1939, the number
of listeners increased from 4, 177,000 to 12, 500,000. See Heide Riedel,
60 Jahre Radio: Von der Raritiit zum Massenmedium (Berlin: Deutsches
Rundfunk Museum, 1983) 61-65.
7. Corporate directorships, then as now, relied upon pooling leading figures
from banking, the government, and related corporations .  In addition, infor­
mai advising circles made up of corporate leaders and government officiais
met regularly in order to coordinate activities . For detailed instances ofboth,
see the Kurt von Schroeder interrogations National Archive (NI-247).
8. Mitteilungen.
9 . The RPM divided its first consumer-targeted receiver production order for 
over 10,000 sets among the five largest television manufacturing companies : 
Telefunken, Fernseh, Lorenz, Loewe, and Tedake. The Post Ministry pro­
vided a 25 percent subsidy (RPM files, 9 March 1939) . Declaration ofhostilities 
effectively stopped production. Immediate postwar intelligence suggests that 
of this in itial order, only between 600 and 1 ,000 sets were actually pro.duced 
(British Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee, Report No .  867) . Curiously, 
these events paralleled developments in the United States. The FCC estab­
lished its VHF broadcast standard of525 lines in 1941 ,  finally permitting mass 
production of receivers. However, America' s entry into the war that same 
year put an immediate stop to commercial production . See Brian Winston, 
Misunderstanding Media (Cambridge : Harvard UP, 1986) 13 . 
10 . See Bundesarchiv RPM correspondence (R48/4343, 4344); by 1934, the
Post' s annual television research and development expenditures reached
about 500,000 RM with an additional 400,000 RM in ancillary expenses
provided specifically for television' s refinement (RPM correspondence to
RFM,  R2/4903).
1 1 . For a discussion of the multinational technological and conceptual origins
and developmental pattern of early television technology see Winston, Mis­
understanding Media and Gerhard Goebel, "Das Fernsehen in Deutsch4i.nd
bis zum Jahre 1945, " Archiv für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen 5 (1953) :
259--393.
12. Typically, the government subsidized research and development costs and
with the perfection of technologies pennitted the industries involved to
control the resulting patents . This level of integration accounts in part for
the extraordinary cooperation both among industries and between industry
and state . For a fuller study of this integration see, Manfred Hempel, Der
braune Kanal (Leipzig: Karl Marx Universitat, 1969) and Manfred Hempel
"Die Entstehung und Entwicklung der Television in Deutschland bis zur
Zerschlagung des Hitlerregimes, " Mitteilungen des Postmuseums Berlin 314
(1970) : 33-75.
13. For an overview of these investments from the perspective of an industry
apologist, see Robert Sobel, IT&T: The Management of Opportunity (New
York : Times Books , 1982) .
14. See, for example, IT&T's corporate history by Sobe!. The range of corporate
interconnections covered the ideological spectrum. On 5 May 1937, the
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New York Times announced that Moscow television reached an agreement 
regarding RCA devices-the same period in which its patents were shared 
with Telefunken . 
15. Baird dropped out after a few years, and Loewe dropped out in the mid-
1930s . This was a period of intense capital demand, with an es timated
corporate expenditure of20 million RM up to 1939 (with profits from exports
and the German Post coming in at about 8 million). By contrast, Telefunken' s
expenditures are estimated at 15 million RM and the other companies
· totaling 8 million (Goebel cited in Fritjof Rudert, "Fifty Years of Fernseh ,
1929--1979," Bosch Technische Berichte 6. 5/6 [May 1979]: 28--58, here, 29).
By 1938, just as profitability was showing signs of turning around, Zeiss-Ikon
also dropped out, leaving Fernseh a Bosch subsidiary, which it remains
today.
16. Bundesarchiv RPM/RRG correspondence to RFA R2/4903 1934-35. The
British announced a proposed start-up date in fall 1935, allegedly prompting
the German move in spring.
17. IT&T's investment behavior is instructive. By 1930, IT&T owned or con­
trolled subsidiaries on every continent. See Anthony Sampson, The Sover­
eign State of IT&T (New York: Stein and Day, 1973) .
18. Detailed analysis of specific industries has begun to alter the view that
National Socialist economic policy was unsystematic and reactive, relying
primarily on public works, rearmament, and war. See, for example, R. J .
Overy, "Transport and Rearmament in the Third Reich, " Historical ]ournal
16 (1973) : 389--409 and R. J . Overy, The Nazi Economie Recovery: 1932-
1938 (London: Macmillan, 1982) .
19. Emil Lederer points out that by September 1939, some 73 percent of
German y' s trade was with the industrialized world. See his "Gegen Autarkie
und Nationalismus , "  Kapitalismus, Klassenstruktur und Probleme der Denw­
kratie in Deutschland 1910-1940, ed. Jürgen Kocka (Gôttingen :  Vanden­
hoeck & Ruprecht, 1979) 199--209. Although the economy was assisted by
Schacht' s public works and expenditures programs (mapped out by Strasser
in 1932) , growth of the export sector was critical . In April of 1933, Hitler
pointed out the West's mistake in providing industrial development to pre­
viously undeveloped parts of the world together with its implications for the
German economy (see Peter Krüger, "Zu Hitler's 'nationalsozialistischen
Wirtschaftserkenntnissen, ' "  Geschichte und GeseUschaft 2 (1980] : 263-82;
here, 274). Expansion into new areas was a key strategy (see Lotte Zumpe,
"Weltwirtschaftslage und faschistische AuBenwirtschaftsregulierung, " J ahr­
buch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 4 [ 1978] : 201-7; here, 203ff), and television
was ideal in this regard.
20. The broadcasting exhibitions reported annual admissions of over 300,000.
Olympie television appeared in up to 25 television halls , including one
in Potsdam and two in Leipzig (one of which seated nearly 400 people) .
Programming was increased from the usual 3 hours per day to over 8 hours ,
and attendance was put at 162, 228.
21 . Although the 1936 Olympics served as a public testing ground for both RCA
and Farnsworth systems, the Postal Ministry apparently perceived the RCA
system as superior and supported national conversion to the RCA standard
before actual coverage of the games .
22. United Kingdom Trading with the Enemy Act, 1939; United States Trading
with the Enemy Act, 1917, amended 1940, 1941 , etc. ; Executive Ortler No.
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8389 of 10 April 1940, etc . , Martin Domke, Trading with the Enemy in 
World War Il (New York: Central Book Co. , 1943) . 
Despite trading-with-the-enemy legislation, multinational corporations were 
uniquely positioned to main tain their investments . IT &T provides an unusu­
ally well-documented case .  lts CEO, Sosthenes Behn, cultivated close rela­
tions with the Reich, and IT&T was one of the first foreign companies to be 
declared "German, "  thus exempt from the Reich Custodian of Alien Prop­
erty. Although a series of investigations were begun by the Department of 
Justice and the FBI, by the start of the cold war, IT&T's complicity with the 
German state was reframed. Day-to-day control of its German operations 
was seen as outside IT&T s direct control. N evertheless, testimony by 1T &T' s 
German directors Westrick and Schroeder confücts with postwar corporate 
testimony on this issue . See, for example, Schroeder interrogations, National 
Archive, Nl-234, 15 November 1945 and Nl-235, 16 November 1945. 
Regarding patent exchanges, German trade journals regularly reported on 
the patent developments of and licence agreements with their American 
affiliates such as RCA until total war caused the suspension of their publica­
tion. Close parallels in American and German television weapon patent 
development after this blackout suggest that information flow continued. 
On the surface at least, close parallels exist between Telefunken and RCA's 
developments of television surveillance planes, television-guided and heat­
seeking missiles, and so on . Their correspondences mark an area of ongoing 
research . IT&Ts involvement with war-related technologies and industries 
is more fully documented. 
Documented in the Bundesarchiv RFM files, R2/4903. 
Reichsgesetzblatt T. 1 No. 88 (12 July 1935) 1059. 
Reich Chancellory papers , Bundesarchiv, R43II/267a. 
Reichsgesetzblatt T. 1 No. 136 (1 1 December 1935) 1429--30. 
Given the awareness of military applications evident even in the fax transmis­
sions of the late 1920s, this latter allocation is not surprising. By the early 
1940s, development of television-guided missiles, torpedoes, unmanned 
surveillance planes, and related technologies such as radar and heat-seeking 
missiles were under military directive . See Combined Intelligence Objec­
tives Subcommittee (CIOS) Report No. 28-41 ,  No. 31-1, No. 3 1-8; British 
Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee (BIOS) Report No. 867; Public Re­
cords Office (London) AIR MIN files 40/1656, 40/2000. 
See, for example , Hadamovsky' s Der Rundfunk im Dienste der Volksführung 
(Leipzig: R. Noske, 1934) and Propaganda und nationale Macht (Oldenburg: 
G. Stalling, 1933), English translation, Propaganda and National Power
(New York: Arno, 1972) .
This mechanical technology was occasionally judged by the British as supe­
rior to their electric systems in terms of image clarity, and the Germans
were able to push it far beyond expected limits to a 729 line image, see_
Ernest H. Traub, "Television at the Berlin Radio Exhibition, 1937" Journal
of the Television Society, 2d Ser. 2 . 1 1  (December 1937) : 289--97.
15 July 1937.
Programming consisted of Kulturfilme and shortened feature films, sports,


























"M usikalisches Zwischenspiel" 
"Das Deutsche Rote Kreuz" 
"Das schône Deutschland" 
"Altwiener Bilder" 
Einführung in die Veranstaltungsreihe "Sport und 
Mikrofon" 
17:45 "Aus der Werkstatt des Rundfunks" 
18:35 "Ein Traum im Puppenladen" 
19: 15-20:00 (Pause) 
20:00 Nachrichten, Wetter 
20: 15 "Interessantes aus aller Welt" 
20:25 Zeitdienst 
21 :00 "Altwiener Bilder" 
22 :00-22:20 Nachrichten, Wetter, Sport 
For a fuller discussion of German technical advances, see the BIOS, CIOS , 
and FIAT reports. 
Space constraints preclude a discussion of attitude formation and reception 
in the 1920s and early 1930s, during which, among other things, television' s 
utopian dimension predominated. See Monika Elsner, Thomas Müller, Pe­
ter M .  Spangenberg, ''The Early History of German Television : The Slow 




The patterns of reception in popular, trade, and industrial discourse obvi­
ously constitutes a huge area of study which this article can only introduce . 
Coverage regarding the start of German television service is typical . See, 
New York Times 30 June 1935, 2 February 1935, 27 April 1935. 
New York Times 4 September 1935. A related set of assertions addressed the 
lag in U. S. television deployment relative to German y and Britain in positive 
tenns. Following assertions from American industry, Judge E. 0. Sykes of the 
FCC was reported to have told the British, "If you start tclevision over there 
before we do here, well wait and profit by your mistakes. " (New York Times, 
n .d . , 1934, from N .  E. Kersta papers , File 2a, Pennsylvania State U . )
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"M usikalisches Zwischenspiel" 
"Das Deutsche Rote Kreuz" 
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47. The technological advantages that potentially could be gained, together with
issues of staff recruitment from among German engineers and footholds for
subsequent corporate reconfiguration in Germany, were huge. Corporations
sent their own investigators, often through military channels. IT&T's CEO,
Sosthenes Behn, arrived in France in 1944 wearing battle fatigues, and two
of his vice presidents-who months earlier enjoyed corporate positions in
New York-appeared as high-ranking army officers. See Sampson (an IT&T
critic) and Sobel (an IT&T supporter) for essentially overlapping testimony
on this point.
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Conflict and Historical 
Continuity in GDR Film 
Barton Byg 
Functions of Cinema in the GOR 
The waves of young people leaving the German Democratic 
Republic in 1989 and the ensuing political upheaval (leading to that 
state's demise) reflected a crisis of confidence and continuity between 
generations that had been evident in GDR culture for some time. For 
instance, Günter Erbe distinguished between the generation of GDR 
poets active since the early 1960s, who saw themselves as part of a great 
social movement to perfect socialism, and the generation born after 1945 
or 1950, who had a less solid attachment to the GDR.1 The lack of interest
many young people demonstrated in the future of socialism is typified in 
Qle oft-quoted remark by the poet Fritz-Hendrik Melle (born in 1960) 
regarding Volker Braun. "Ali I can say is, that boy is torturing himself."2
Perhaps too late to rejuvenate GDR film, however, the late 1980s also 
